Watch for Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to be forced from office in the near future, leaving the country essentially without any elected leadership. Pressures were mounting by May 12, 2008, for him to resign, while at the same time the Presidency is also in a vaccuum.
Now, key officials in Saudi Arabia and the US are beginning to realize that the only way to stop the massive Tehran-Damascus de facto takeover of Lebanon, and Iran’s strategic m0ve into the Mediterranean and Europe, is to replace the pivotal Iranian lynchpin: Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. And, as this site has constantly noted, the only viable replacement which would keep Syria intact and the region stable is Bashar’s exiled and highly-experienced uncle, Rifat al-Asad.
Meanwhile, series of watershed trends over the past year in Lebanon and in the Mashreq generally — coupled with a decisive and well-executed thrust from the Iranian and Syrian leaderships in May 2008 — have effectively transformed the strategic balance in the Middle East, guaranteeing Tehran its long-sought dominant position on the Mediterranean.
This will be exploited further as Tehran begins to take advantage of the ongoing transformation of Iraq.
US Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1947 said that if the Mediterranean should be closed to the United States, then the US would be closer to war. The lightly-masked Iranian presence, through HizbAllah, on the Lebanese shores of the Mediterranean is now so strongly entrenched that, absent a change of leadership in Tehran, the Mediterranean is, indeed, becoming less hospitable to the US.
The end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 had seen the start of the reconstruction along national lines of the Armed Forces of Lebanon, but over the past year or so that reorganization gave way to a sectarian restructuring of the forces, with brigades re-formed to represent the areas — and therefore the religious and social leadership affiliations — in which they were raised.
As a result, the collapse of Lebanese Government control of the country which was evidenced in the May 7-10, 2008, period was directly linked to the reality that the Armed Forces essentially lost the ability to confront the growing power of Iranian-backed (through Syria) HizbAllah forces. Shi’a brigades of the Army switched allegiance from the Government to HizbAllah.
Thus, the slow, patient work of moving the Army away from its national character over the past year or so — a trend which went largely unnoticed by US policymakers and, indeed, other regional players — which had been sponsored by Tehran, Damascus, and the HizbAllah/Shia leadership in Lebanon was an essential element in allowing HizbAllah to declare a checkmate of the Government when it staged a quiet coup d’etat on May 7-8, 3008.
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, whose legitimacy had been disputed by the opposition (and particularly by HizbAllah), tasked the Army on May 10, 2008, with containing HizbAllah, but, in essence, it was a mere gesture. HizbAllah military units began withdrawing on May 10, 2008, from Beirut, in the knowledge that they had demonstrated the weakness of the Siniora Government and the power of the Sunni-dominated governing coalition under Saad al-Hariri. Significantly, the HizbAllah fighters were handing their positions to a mixture of Amal Shi'ite militiamen and the Army’s Shi’ite brigades loyal to them. Hence, HizbAllah has not lost all of its control over the segments of Beirut it occupied.
Significantly, not only was the Army clearly shown to now have difficulty in even considering a confrontation of HizbAllah, the Tehran-Damascus-HizbAllah thrust also had the backing of the Maronite Christian former Lebanese Army commander and former Prime Minister, Michel Aoun. Significantly, Aoun, who had wished to be perceived as the “savior of the Christian community” and had been seen as strenuously opposed to the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, had been rejected by Maronite Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Boutros Cardinal Sfeir, 88, in this role. Cardinal Sfeir and Aoun have been at daggers-drawn for decades, and the Patriarch’s remaining power has been to deny Aoun good standing in the Christian community.
As a result, Aoun, now enormously wealthy from unspecified deals, still has a following, but nowhere to go, politically, and has thus given his support to HizbAllah.
This has compounded HizbAllah’s strength and continued to fragment the Christian community, as well as, indeed, the Sunni elements of the Government which also oppose Syrian occupation of Lebanon (now represented by Syrian/Iranian control of HizbAllah).
Tehran has been maneuvering carefully in the broader strategic sense (apart from uncontrolled comments lately by Iranian Pres. Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad) so as to avoid giving the US an excuse to move once again toward a direct military confrontation with Iran before the US Presidential elections in November 2008. As a result, it was content to keep putting the appropriate pieces of its forward strategy in place as discreetly as possible, even showing enormous restraint in the war for personal power between its two key assets in Iraq, cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
A trigger, however, for an overt move in Lebanon by Tehran — via HizbAllah — came on the morning of May 6, 2008, when the Siniora Government announced that Brig.-Gen. Wafic Shoucair (who is closely tied to HizbAllah), would be removed from his post as head of Beirut International Airport security – a position he was using to clear into Lebanon the flow of Iranian and Iran-trained personnel as well as weapons arriving on flights from Iran. At the same time, the Siniora Government said that HizbAllah’s private and encrypted communication network was illegal and unconstitutional and said that it would refer the issue to the Arab League and the international community.
Tehran and Damascus, and HizbAllah, had to move quickly to avoid the Government achieving any success in breaking HizbAllah’s power. And even then, the move was as careful and non-confrontational as possible, demonstrating Tehran’s control without launching HizbAllah back into open warfare with the Government of Lebanon’s forces. HizbAllah was aided by the commander of the Lebanese Army and presidential candidate General Michel Suleiman who, after receiving a telephone call from Damascus, notified Seniora that the Lebanese Army would not fire on Lebanese citizens – that is the HizbAllah, Amal and SSNP fighters -- even if they carried arms. Meanwhile, the small militia of Hariri (which was guarding his media empire) and Walid Jumblatt (securing his assets in Beirut) collapsed with little or no battle. They stood aside as the HizbAllah destroyed Hariri’s media building. As well, three senior Druze commanders and their forces switched to HizbAllah on advice of Syria.
As a result, Seniora knew he had no alternative but to capitulate.
Even so, HizbAllah and other Shia elements – as well as the Damascus-controlled, predominantly Christian/Greek Orthodox SSNP -- on the streets of Beirut and other Lebanese cities could not resist showing where their backing was coming from: they carried large portraits of Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Asad.
On May 10, 2008, Fouad Siniora offered HizbAllah and its patrons an olive branch in a speech to the nation. He reversed the two key decisions which started the crisis – restoring Shoucair and nominating an Army team to work with the HizbAllah on ensuring that their communications grid does not interfere with the national grid. Siniora also promised to look into the host of social issues habitually raised by HizbAllah in the name of Lebanon’s oppressed, thus reiterating the growing importance of HizbAllah in the Lebanese political scene.
Meanwhile, fresh out of Beirut, HizbAllah’s elite units moved quickly to consolidate their control over all the key axes of transportation between south Lebanon and the Beirut area, the strategic coastal facilities between Sidon, Tyre and Beirut, as well as the roads between the Beqaa and Beirut. HizbAllah forces also expanded their hold over the entire Beqaa, expelling the small Lebanese military garrisons. Soon afterwards, in the early hours of May 10, 2008, advance units of the Syrian 10th Division crossed into Lebanon and established positions overlooking key transportation arteries and UNIFIL bases.
The 10th Division, along the 14th Commando Division is deployed along the Syrian-Lebanese border from the Damascus-Beirut Highway to the border with Israel. The two divisions and a special military intelligence/special forces contingent constitute a Task Force under the command of Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother.
Significantly, throughout this strategic upheaval, the 15,000 troops of the United Nations Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the vast majority of them from major NATO countries, did nothing but stay inside their camps. They reduced patrolling to a symbolic minimum. They did not even report and protest the large force movements by HizbAllah in and out of south Lebanon which constitutes a flagrant violation of UNSC Resolution 1701 (not to speak of harming the vital interests of the international community in Lebanon). The behavior of the UN and UNIFIL begs the question as to why the United Nations deploys forces at all in Lebanon, and, by so doing and then failing to act, whether it is, in fact, legitimizing the Syrian and Iranian subversion of the Lebanese state.
There are signs, however, that the impotence of the US-supported Siniora Government in Lebanon, and of other regional players such as Saudi Arabia with regard to Lebanon, have aroused concern in Washington. The de facto coup in Lebanon of May 2008 has given impetus to the faction within the White House and US Defense Department which believes that the Iranian leadership had effectively ended the “truce” agreed between Tehran and Washington in November 2007, freeing the US to once again consider military action to contain Iran.
At the same time, Washington is now beginning to see – as the Saudi Arabian Government began to see over the past year – that the quick solution to short-circuiting Iran’s strategic indirect-power expansion into the Mediterranean and Europe is to see Bashar al-Asad removed as President of Syria. That is a delicate matter, and would require the insertion of an acceptable ‘Alawite leader who could balance the Syrian polity. And the only candidate available is the one Saudi Arabia supports, even at the expense of their original first choice, a Sunni leader: Rifat al-Asad, the uncle of Bashar al-Asad.
The difference between Bashar and his Uncle, Rifat, is that Rifat would quickly move to end Syrian dependence on Iran, stop the process of supporting HizbAllah (because Syria is the vital conduit for Iranian operations with HizbAllah), and withdrew Syrian sponsorship of terrorism in Lebanon and, for that matter, Iraq.
Rifat is cognizant of, and great believer in, the crucial rôle played by the minorities dwelling along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean in the development of the entire Mashreq. Therefore, once in power, he has indicated that he would consolidate an alliance of these minorities — most notably, the Alawites, Maronites, and Druze — in order to revive their regional significance. In so doing, Rifat would be restoring the unique traditional character of Lebanon as a bridge between East and West.
Ultimately, Rifat has indicated that his priority would be to transform Syria into a market economy so that it could benefit from the dramatic changes in the Levant, and end the decades of socialist and pro-clerical authoritarian social control imposed by his late brother, Hafez al-Asad, and Hafez’ son, Bashar. Given the intricate nature of the Mashreq, such dramatic changes in Syria would quickly spread across borders into Iraq and Jordan as well.
Seeing Rifat into office – given that he is also publicly one of the most acceptable candidates – would essentially undercut Iran’s expansion strategy, and would do more to isolate the Iranian clerics than any other single move. And seeing Rifat in the Syrian Presidency would, in fact, also markedly impact on the Iraqi security situation, withdrawing one major area of support for the insurgent movements operating there.
Monday, May 12, 2008
Thursday, December 20, 2007
Bush Finally Takes Off the Gloves With Bashar
Long overdue: US President George W. Bush today — December 20, 2007 — took off the gloves and said that he had run out of patience with Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. What happens now? That may be part of the deal the White House has done with Iran’s clerical leaders.
Indeed, the November 2007 secret deal between Washington and Tehran took off the table the threat of US military action with regard to Iran, which means that Tehran’s clerics don’t need Bashar and Damascus in quite the pressing way they did before. It’s true that Tehran won’t readily abandon HizbAllah any time soon, but the mullahs can find other ways to deal with it other than relying solely on Bashar in Damascus.
What this means is that the US now feels, rightly or wrongly, that it has a much more free hand to deal with Bashar. And Bashar, as far as the Bush White House is concerned, is a far more manageable target than Tehran. So watch for Washington to use 2008 to show some muscle in the battle to replace Bashar. This has been made much easier by the fact that a replacement is already in the wings — indeed, he’s been there for years — who can ensure more than just a smooth transition of power in Damascus.
Rifaat al-Assad, Bashar’s uncle — and polar opposite — would do all the things Washington approves. And he’d do them for the right reasons, as far as most Syrians are concerned, not just because they coincide with Washington’s own desires.
Rifaat has long advocated pulling Syrian forces and intelligence assets and subversive proxies out of Lebanon, in order to build a viable Lebanon and a viable Syria. Pres. Bush said today, at his big press conference: “Syria needs to stay out of Lebanon.” He also said: “My patience ran out on President Assad a long time ago. The reason why is because he houses HAMAS, he facilitates HizbAllah, suiciders go from his country into Iraq and he destabilizes Lebanon.”
Significantly, Rifaat would also move to ensure stable regional relations throughout the Levant: with Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority. Everyone who has been familiar with his policies for the past few decades is aware that Rifaat favors free markets and democracy, as well as playing down religious and cultural differences. Moreover, Rifaat’s views are now accepted by most of the Arab leaders who recognize that decades of diversion created by anti-Israeli policies have meant that local aspirations have gone unaddressed. The Saudi leadership, which once insisted that the next Syrian leader should be a Sunni Muslim, have now fully endorsed Rifaat, and have told Washington this.
If Pres. Bush wants to make some friends in Israel, and push Israel further along the “comfort zone” in creating a new Palestinian state, when he visits Israel in the coming weeks, then the best thing he can do is start showing that he will help Rifaat into office in Damascus — where “the word” from our friends is that he will be warmly welcomed — as soon as possible. That will also bring HizbAllah back into line in Lebanon, and start the regional healing process. Let’s face it: decades of support by the US State Dept. for maintaining the status quo in Damascus has failed to deliver.
A new Bush approach along the lines suggested would deliver the Middle East peace which has eluded every US president since Jimmy Carter. More than that, French Pres. Nicholas Sarkozy is also calling for Bashar’s head on a plate, and the latest blatant Syrian attempts to influence the election of the new President of Lebanon have added fuel to the anti-Bashar fire.
Bush rammed the point home: “If he is listening to me — and he certainly doesn’t need a phone call — he will know what my position is.” But just what Bush will do is still the subject of conjecture, and hopefully will remain that way until the axe falls in Damascus.
Even the Iranian clerics seem to be going along with Bush. And Bashar is clearly on the defensive. His December 19, 2007, interview with Die Presse, in Vienna, said that there could no peace in the Middle East without Iranian cooperation, and implicitly this included the Iran-Syria alliance. But Washington may have already short-circuited that, by including Iran without Syria in the new peace process.
Indeed, the November 2007 secret deal between Washington and Tehran took off the table the threat of US military action with regard to Iran, which means that Tehran’s clerics don’t need Bashar and Damascus in quite the pressing way they did before. It’s true that Tehran won’t readily abandon HizbAllah any time soon, but the mullahs can find other ways to deal with it other than relying solely on Bashar in Damascus.
What this means is that the US now feels, rightly or wrongly, that it has a much more free hand to deal with Bashar. And Bashar, as far as the Bush White House is concerned, is a far more manageable target than Tehran. So watch for Washington to use 2008 to show some muscle in the battle to replace Bashar. This has been made much easier by the fact that a replacement is already in the wings — indeed, he’s been there for years — who can ensure more than just a smooth transition of power in Damascus.
Rifaat al-Assad, Bashar’s uncle — and polar opposite — would do all the things Washington approves. And he’d do them for the right reasons, as far as most Syrians are concerned, not just because they coincide with Washington’s own desires.
Rifaat has long advocated pulling Syrian forces and intelligence assets and subversive proxies out of Lebanon, in order to build a viable Lebanon and a viable Syria. Pres. Bush said today, at his big press conference: “Syria needs to stay out of Lebanon.” He also said: “My patience ran out on President Assad a long time ago. The reason why is because he houses HAMAS, he facilitates HizbAllah, suiciders go from his country into Iraq and he destabilizes Lebanon.”
Significantly, Rifaat would also move to ensure stable regional relations throughout the Levant: with Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority. Everyone who has been familiar with his policies for the past few decades is aware that Rifaat favors free markets and democracy, as well as playing down religious and cultural differences. Moreover, Rifaat’s views are now accepted by most of the Arab leaders who recognize that decades of diversion created by anti-Israeli policies have meant that local aspirations have gone unaddressed. The Saudi leadership, which once insisted that the next Syrian leader should be a Sunni Muslim, have now fully endorsed Rifaat, and have told Washington this.
If Pres. Bush wants to make some friends in Israel, and push Israel further along the “comfort zone” in creating a new Palestinian state, when he visits Israel in the coming weeks, then the best thing he can do is start showing that he will help Rifaat into office in Damascus — where “the word” from our friends is that he will be warmly welcomed — as soon as possible. That will also bring HizbAllah back into line in Lebanon, and start the regional healing process. Let’s face it: decades of support by the US State Dept. for maintaining the status quo in Damascus has failed to deliver.
A new Bush approach along the lines suggested would deliver the Middle East peace which has eluded every US president since Jimmy Carter. More than that, French Pres. Nicholas Sarkozy is also calling for Bashar’s head on a plate, and the latest blatant Syrian attempts to influence the election of the new President of Lebanon have added fuel to the anti-Bashar fire.
Bush rammed the point home: “If he is listening to me — and he certainly doesn’t need a phone call — he will know what my position is.” But just what Bush will do is still the subject of conjecture, and hopefully will remain that way until the axe falls in Damascus.
Even the Iranian clerics seem to be going along with Bush. And Bashar is clearly on the defensive. His December 19, 2007, interview with Die Presse, in Vienna, said that there could no peace in the Middle East without Iranian cooperation, and implicitly this included the Iran-Syria alliance. But Washington may have already short-circuited that, by including Iran without Syria in the new peace process.
Saturday, October 20, 2007
The White House Decides Bashar’s Time is Up
The White House has decided that Bashar al-Assad’s time is up, even though he still has some friends in the State Department. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s failure to get Bashar to stop funding terrorism and promoting insurgent warfare against the Coalition forces in Iraq has finally boiled over, embarrassing both her and angering US Pres. George W. Bush and his key advisors.
Now, both the Bush White House and the Saudi leadership have had enough; and the Bush-Sa’ud alliance on this matter is lethal for Bashar. They want Bashar out, and his uncle, Dr. Rifa’at al-Assad, in. For good reason: Rifa’at — a seasoned, reasonable, and highly-intelligent leader and statesman — has always opposed the kind of strategically suicidal policies of Bashar and his Iranian masters, and wants a stable Levant and a prosperous, market-oriented, secure Syria, living in peace with its neighbors as part of the Mediterranean trading community.
Bashar thought he could go on insulting and injuring the US with impunity. Did he think that he could become continually more brazen in his support for insurgency in Iraq and murder in Lebanon, not to mention the once-again open logistical support for HizbAllah in Lebanon? Is he trying to see how much insult Washington would take, by supporting — as he did in mid-Ocxtober 2007 — Turkey’s plans to invade northern Iraq? Did he not think that even Washington, preoccupied with other matters, would not eventually notice the dramatic disconnect between his lies and his actions?
Well, maybe the State Department would take it. Foggy Bottom, the State Department’s area of Washington, DC, has always had a love affair with people who insult the US. But the White House is another matter, and so is the US Congress and the US Defense Department. And so, too, is Saudi Arabia, which has a deep strategic relationship with Washington. And Bashar has finally exhausted the patience of Saudi King ‘Abdallah, who had worked hard — along with strategic advisor Prince Bandar — to find a solution which included Bashar. That’s all ended.
Dr. Rifa’at al-Assad was recently invited to Mecca to meet with King ‘Abdallah and key Saudi leaders, and, by mid-October 2007, the Saudis had made it clear that they wanted Bashar out of power and Rifa’at — who knows all the corridors of power in Damascus — in charge. Gone are Saudi thoughts of trying to force a Sunni leader to the top in Damascus. And now Saudi Arabia has convinced the US White House and Pentagon that Bashar’s removal is the only thing which could stop the Syrian-supported carnage in Iraq and Damascus’ and Tehran’s planned destabilization of the Levant. Moreover, removing the Syrian leg from Iran’s three-legged stool (Iran, Syria, and North Korea) would do more than any other single thing to stop the Iranian strategic juggernaut.
Sure, the Saudis have been angry with Bashar for the Syrian-sponsored smear campaign against the Royal Family, but that, like Bashar’s gratuitous insults of the US, has now gone too far. Bashar promises to help Iran carve up Iraq, and that would seriously threaten stability in the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia’s strategic position.
Bashar is like a man jumping from an aircraft without a parachute. It all seems to be going very well indeed, until that last little dose of reality: hitting the ground.
Now, both the Bush White House and the Saudi leadership have had enough; and the Bush-Sa’ud alliance on this matter is lethal for Bashar. They want Bashar out, and his uncle, Dr. Rifa’at al-Assad, in. For good reason: Rifa’at — a seasoned, reasonable, and highly-intelligent leader and statesman — has always opposed the kind of strategically suicidal policies of Bashar and his Iranian masters, and wants a stable Levant and a prosperous, market-oriented, secure Syria, living in peace with its neighbors as part of the Mediterranean trading community.
Bashar thought he could go on insulting and injuring the US with impunity. Did he think that he could become continually more brazen in his support for insurgency in Iraq and murder in Lebanon, not to mention the once-again open logistical support for HizbAllah in Lebanon? Is he trying to see how much insult Washington would take, by supporting — as he did in mid-Ocxtober 2007 — Turkey’s plans to invade northern Iraq? Did he not think that even Washington, preoccupied with other matters, would not eventually notice the dramatic disconnect between his lies and his actions?
Well, maybe the State Department would take it. Foggy Bottom, the State Department’s area of Washington, DC, has always had a love affair with people who insult the US. But the White House is another matter, and so is the US Congress and the US Defense Department. And so, too, is Saudi Arabia, which has a deep strategic relationship with Washington. And Bashar has finally exhausted the patience of Saudi King ‘Abdallah, who had worked hard — along with strategic advisor Prince Bandar — to find a solution which included Bashar. That’s all ended.
Dr. Rifa’at al-Assad was recently invited to Mecca to meet with King ‘Abdallah and key Saudi leaders, and, by mid-October 2007, the Saudis had made it clear that they wanted Bashar out of power and Rifa’at — who knows all the corridors of power in Damascus — in charge. Gone are Saudi thoughts of trying to force a Sunni leader to the top in Damascus. And now Saudi Arabia has convinced the US White House and Pentagon that Bashar’s removal is the only thing which could stop the Syrian-supported carnage in Iraq and Damascus’ and Tehran’s planned destabilization of the Levant. Moreover, removing the Syrian leg from Iran’s three-legged stool (Iran, Syria, and North Korea) would do more than any other single thing to stop the Iranian strategic juggernaut.
Sure, the Saudis have been angry with Bashar for the Syrian-sponsored smear campaign against the Royal Family, but that, like Bashar’s gratuitous insults of the US, has now gone too far. Bashar promises to help Iran carve up Iraq, and that would seriously threaten stability in the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia’s strategic position.
Bashar is like a man jumping from an aircraft without a parachute. It all seems to be going very well indeed, until that last little dose of reality: hitting the ground.
Tuesday, October 2, 2007
Bashar Sacrifices Syrian Lives for Tehran
What was Bashar al-Assad thinking when he began accepting strategic missiles — and, by all accounts, nuclear warheads to fit on them — from North Korea, merely as part of an Iranian strategy to save the clerical leaders from overthrow? The Israeli air raid of September 6, 2007, not only killed a significant number of Syrians and North Koreans, it served notice that Bashar was getting ready to participate in a massive war against Israel, a war which will cost many tens of thousands of Syrian lives.
For what?
Bashar has forgotten that he is supposed to be the President of the Syrian People. He thinks now only about protecting his position, and he believes that only by kowtowing to the Iranian clerics can he be saved. And saved from whom? Clearly, the very Syrian People whom he is supposed to be leading.
It is now an open secret that Bashar has committed the Syrian forces to be part of a massive front which will comprise Iran, Syria, North Korea, HizbAllah, HAMAS in Gaza, and forces in Somalia, and elsewhere, and which will rise against Israel and the US at some time in the near future. Again the question: What does this do for Syria and the Syrian People? Why does Syria need to attack its neighbors and the West? What do we gain from this?
Once again, Bashar has bloodied his hands in Lebanon, killing more politicians and innocent Lebanese civilians, merely so he can protect the HizbAllah position there, because Iran has demanded that HizbAllah be protected, and supported, and prepared for the new war against Israel. What seems likely is that the Iranian clerics are prepared to fight to the last Syrian, and even the last Iranian civilian, to protect their grasp on power.
It’s time for the Syrian military to begin saying “no” to Bashar, and to start protecting Syria from the likes of Bashar and his apocalyptic clerical friends. His late father, Hafez, certainly knew the difference between a strategic geopolitical alliance with Iran, and selling his soul to the pseudo-clerics who are now the dictators of Iran. No wonder Bashar does not want to see, or hear of, his uncle, Rifa’at al-Assad, who, from exile, is the voice of reason, saying: no to unnecessary war with Israel or the US; no to the unnecessary occupation of Lebanon; no to the subjugation of the Syrian People and their right to an economic free market.
Watch for it: Bashar is dragging Syria into a new, major war, and at the end of the day the only thing which will emerge unblemished from the carnage will be Bashar himself, untouched in his bunker while Syria burns.
No decent Syrian would deny the duty of sacrifice for the nation and for future generations of Syrians. But what decent Syrian would say that dying to keep Bashar in power — and a servant of Tehran — equates to patriotism?
For what?
Bashar has forgotten that he is supposed to be the President of the Syrian People. He thinks now only about protecting his position, and he believes that only by kowtowing to the Iranian clerics can he be saved. And saved from whom? Clearly, the very Syrian People whom he is supposed to be leading.
It is now an open secret that Bashar has committed the Syrian forces to be part of a massive front which will comprise Iran, Syria, North Korea, HizbAllah, HAMAS in Gaza, and forces in Somalia, and elsewhere, and which will rise against Israel and the US at some time in the near future. Again the question: What does this do for Syria and the Syrian People? Why does Syria need to attack its neighbors and the West? What do we gain from this?
Once again, Bashar has bloodied his hands in Lebanon, killing more politicians and innocent Lebanese civilians, merely so he can protect the HizbAllah position there, because Iran has demanded that HizbAllah be protected, and supported, and prepared for the new war against Israel. What seems likely is that the Iranian clerics are prepared to fight to the last Syrian, and even the last Iranian civilian, to protect their grasp on power.
It’s time for the Syrian military to begin saying “no” to Bashar, and to start protecting Syria from the likes of Bashar and his apocalyptic clerical friends. His late father, Hafez, certainly knew the difference between a strategic geopolitical alliance with Iran, and selling his soul to the pseudo-clerics who are now the dictators of Iran. No wonder Bashar does not want to see, or hear of, his uncle, Rifa’at al-Assad, who, from exile, is the voice of reason, saying: no to unnecessary war with Israel or the US; no to the unnecessary occupation of Lebanon; no to the subjugation of the Syrian People and their right to an economic free market.
Watch for it: Bashar is dragging Syria into a new, major war, and at the end of the day the only thing which will emerge unblemished from the carnage will be Bashar himself, untouched in his bunker while Syria burns.
No decent Syrian would deny the duty of sacrifice for the nation and for future generations of Syrians. But what decent Syrian would say that dying to keep Bashar in power — and a servant of Tehran — equates to patriotism?
Saturday, August 25, 2007
Saudi King's Outburst Pushes an Embattled Bashar Further Into the Corner
The attack by Saudi Arabian King ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud on Syria’s Bashar al-Assad during late August 2007 over Bashar’s sponsorship of the HAMAS takeover of Gaza in June 2007 has further isolated Damascus at a time when Bashar and the Iranian clerics are literally fighting for their lives.
Bashar and the Iranian clerics have been working for months to get all the pieces in place for a renewed conflict with Israel and possibly the US, as a means of broadening the Middle East conflict to Washington’s detriment. Now, the Saudi King’s attack serves to seriously undermine Bashar’s diminishing credibility at home and in the region. The Saudi King clearly feels betrayed by Bashar who had promised privately, during the Riyadh Arab Summit in March 2007, to ease his ties with Tehran. In fact, Bashar did the reverse. As well, Bashar has been working to ensure that a pro-Syrian President will be elected in Lebanon, to the point where Syrian agents began issuing death threats to the Saudi Ambassador in Beirut.
It’s already in the open media that Lebanese security officials told Prime Minister Fuad Siniora that they had information that Syria, Iran, and HizbAllah were planning a new wave of terror and assassinations in Beirut to prevent the election of the next Lebanese President by a simple parliamentary majority instead of the two-thirds majority required by the constitution.
All this angers not only the Saudi King, but also French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Only the US — which is fighting Syrian-sponsored terrorism inside Iraq — is supporting Bashar’s position in the Lebanese election. King ‘Abdallah will not be taken-in again by Bashar. But why does Washington persist in its naïveté over Bashar?
Ironically, the combination of the French and Saudi positions may awaken the State Department from its Foggy stupor. Either that, or the coming war will do it. Because Bashar and Ahmadi-Nejad cannot last much longer if the US current move in Iraq, with Gen. Petraeus’ successes against the range of Syrian- and Iranian-sponsored insurgents continues at its present pace, and if, as expected, a nationalist military coup takes power in Baghdad in September. Then, Bashar will have a lot less support from an embattled Ahmadi-Nejad in Tehran, and the isolation will begin to tell. The only solution, then, is to lash out. So watch from Bashar to push initially for another proxy war against Israel, using HizbAllah and others, and his new assets in Gaza.
Is this what Washington wants?
Bashar and the Iranian clerics have been working for months to get all the pieces in place for a renewed conflict with Israel and possibly the US, as a means of broadening the Middle East conflict to Washington’s detriment. Now, the Saudi King’s attack serves to seriously undermine Bashar’s diminishing credibility at home and in the region. The Saudi King clearly feels betrayed by Bashar who had promised privately, during the Riyadh Arab Summit in March 2007, to ease his ties with Tehran. In fact, Bashar did the reverse. As well, Bashar has been working to ensure that a pro-Syrian President will be elected in Lebanon, to the point where Syrian agents began issuing death threats to the Saudi Ambassador in Beirut.
It’s already in the open media that Lebanese security officials told Prime Minister Fuad Siniora that they had information that Syria, Iran, and HizbAllah were planning a new wave of terror and assassinations in Beirut to prevent the election of the next Lebanese President by a simple parliamentary majority instead of the two-thirds majority required by the constitution.
All this angers not only the Saudi King, but also French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Only the US — which is fighting Syrian-sponsored terrorism inside Iraq — is supporting Bashar’s position in the Lebanese election. King ‘Abdallah will not be taken-in again by Bashar. But why does Washington persist in its naïveté over Bashar?
Ironically, the combination of the French and Saudi positions may awaken the State Department from its Foggy stupor. Either that, or the coming war will do it. Because Bashar and Ahmadi-Nejad cannot last much longer if the US current move in Iraq, with Gen. Petraeus’ successes against the range of Syrian- and Iranian-sponsored insurgents continues at its present pace, and if, as expected, a nationalist military coup takes power in Baghdad in September. Then, Bashar will have a lot less support from an embattled Ahmadi-Nejad in Tehran, and the isolation will begin to tell. The only solution, then, is to lash out. So watch from Bashar to push initially for another proxy war against Israel, using HizbAllah and others, and his new assets in Gaza.
Is this what Washington wants?
Bashar al-Assad's Scramble to Keep the Iraq War Alive
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad — while working with Iran's clerics to initiate new crises and war with the US and Israel in order to galvanize their respective control of power — is desperately trying to keep the conflict alive in Iraq. To do this, he must keep his and Tehran's allies — Iraqi Pres. Talabani and Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki — in office, averting an anticipated coup attempt against them in September 2007.
Bashar's officials have been liaising almost daily with Maliki's key advisors behind the scenes, and Maliki visited Damascus after his Washington visit in August 2007. An Australian of Iraqi extraction, Gata’a al-Rakaby, who holds an Iraqi diplomatic passport and serves as an advisor to Maliki, has been a frequent visitor to Damascus, bringing with him substantial amounts of cash — all donated by the US taxpayers — to help support Bashar and his key officials.
Indeed, all that Bashar and the clerics have worked for these past few years could come crashing down if Maliki is replaced by a nationalist Iraqi leader, probably a general. This means that Bashar and the clerics will have to push for open conflict against the US and/or Israel in the very near future if they are to upset the apple cart. In the meantime, the situation inside Iraq is transforming rapidly, and not in the way that Tehran and Damascus would like: the Iraqi public is now resisting al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) and even Tehran's onetime poster boy, Moqtada al-Sadr, is talking to the Americans.
Yet despite all this, the clerics and Bashar have as their best ally the US State Department and the former Secretary of State, James Baker, who push for "normalization" and "dialogue" with Bashar and the Iranian clerics. Will the State Department yet again save Bashar and the Iranian clerics who are his paymasters?
Bashar's officials have been liaising almost daily with Maliki's key advisors behind the scenes, and Maliki visited Damascus after his Washington visit in August 2007. An Australian of Iraqi extraction, Gata’a al-Rakaby, who holds an Iraqi diplomatic passport and serves as an advisor to Maliki, has been a frequent visitor to Damascus, bringing with him substantial amounts of cash — all donated by the US taxpayers — to help support Bashar and his key officials.
Indeed, all that Bashar and the clerics have worked for these past few years could come crashing down if Maliki is replaced by a nationalist Iraqi leader, probably a general. This means that Bashar and the clerics will have to push for open conflict against the US and/or Israel in the very near future if they are to upset the apple cart. In the meantime, the situation inside Iraq is transforming rapidly, and not in the way that Tehran and Damascus would like: the Iraqi public is now resisting al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) and even Tehran's onetime poster boy, Moqtada al-Sadr, is talking to the Americans.
Yet despite all this, the clerics and Bashar have as their best ally the US State Department and the former Secretary of State, James Baker, who push for "normalization" and "dialogue" with Bashar and the Iranian clerics. Will the State Department yet again save Bashar and the Iranian clerics who are his paymasters?
Wednesday, August 22, 2007
Syria is Now the Key to Mid-East Stability, But Bashar is the Impediment
The Western world is focused on – and always reacts to – current events in the Middle East. Today it is preoccupied with the ongoing turmoil in Iraq and the prospect of either peace or war with Iran, and with developments in Israel-Palestinian affairs. But one of the most important keys to determining whether there will be any long-term stability in the Middle East, and particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, is being determined in Damascus. And Washington is paying little or no attention to the developments.
Syria now determines the degree of flexibility and opportunism available to the Iranian clerics. Syria, under Iran’s captive, Bashar al-Assad, determines how the Iraq turmoil will play out.
The Iranian clerics have only a couple of interrelated strategic options to break out from their strategic isolation and to win protection from an uprising of their own people: the first is to sell their soul and their country to Moscow and Beijing by embracing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of ducking under the mutual defense clauses of the SCO. The second is to use the clerics’ longstanding control of the Syrian leadership to break out of the physical containment by using Syrian assets to stimulate the civil war in Iraq, and to open the prospect that Iran – after the US and Coalition have withdrawn from Iraq – can literally dominate the land from Iran to the Mediterranean.
Syria is essentially controlled by the Iranian clerics, for reasons outlined below. But Syria is now critical to the survival of the ruling Iranian mullahs’, as much as Bashar owes his political survival to Tehran. Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, had a comfortable arrangement with Tehran’s mullahs, but Bashar, who lacks any kind of independent power base, is now virtually in office at the sufferance of Tehran. And, as a result, Syria’s economy and social base continues to decline. Frustrations abound, and Bashar’s only option is to support the Iranian plan to move toward regional war as a means of distracting and suppressing the Syrian people.
High-blown rhetoric from Damascus and Tehran implies that a major rift exists between the Syrian and Iranian peoples and the US and Israel. The reality is that the rhetoric is designed to literally create a crisis as the only means the Syrian and Iranian leaders have to stop their own populations maneuvering against them.
Significantly, the Western media and foreign policy “experts” keep taking at face value what Bashar and his cohorts, and what the clerics in Tehran, are saying. And Washington is divided, when it comes to Iran, between whether to bomb or to talk. The answer, from the people in Syria and Iran, is that they should do neither. They should neither legitimize the clerics or Bashar by doing deals which are meaningless and which only serve to perpetuate their unrepresentative rule. And they should not bomb, because this would merely force the Syrian and Iranian peoples – essentially pro-Western and awaiting their liberty – to reluctantly rally around the leaders they despise in the face of foreign threats to their homeland.
What, then, is the answer?
It is the more challenging, and yet least damaging, option: to maneuver politically; to use indirect support for the populations of Syria and Iran to achieve a better life. Asian martial arts use the term “give in to win” to describe the tactic of using the inherent momentum of an adversary to defeat him, rather than attacking with one’s own thrust. For the West to win in Syria and Iran, it must use the inherent momentum of the local populations and true leaderships, which have long been suppressed.
Levant Solutions has been given access by concerned officials to a series of special reports which had been distributed to US Government and officials of other governments by the Global Information System (GIS), highlighting the situation with regard to Syria. They highlight the reality which we on the ground in the country already know: that Bashar al-Assad is maneuvering not to achieve peace, or the betterment of Syria, but to actively join with Iran in a war against Israel and the West, so that he can attempt to win the support of the Syrian people, as his father, Hafez al-Assad, did in earlier wars.
In order to do this, Bashar has sold Syria to the Iranian clerics, who use Damascus as a means of furthering their wars in Iraq, and against Syria, and in Lebanon. And through all of this, they hope to build their landbridge to the Mediterranean, which would make them a global power. And this, coupled with the new alliance which the Iranian mullahs have created with Moscow and Beijing, would make the next Cold War far more dangerous for the West than the last. In it all, the peoples of the Levant and the Middle East generally would be unable to achieve the peace they want.
On June 30, 2007, in a Special Report, GIS advised senior US Government officials, in a report entitled Iran, Syria Make Strenuous Preparations for Combat-Readiness, Partly Reflecting Major Internal Leadership Schisms, that a pattern of Iranian and Syrian cooperation was emerging which indicated intensive preparations for imminent hostilities, even in the face of — and perhaps even because of — growing public unrest within their societies. The report went on:
“The June 26-27, 2007, gasoline rationing riots which struck Tehran and other major Iranian cities were perceived by Western media analysts to highlight the weakness of the Iranian clerical Government of Pres. Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad. In fact, more detailed intelligence shows that the clerical leadership not only anticipated the Iranian public unrest over petroleum rationing; that it had adequate reserves of refined petroleum and chose not only not to release these reserves to the public but rather to further ration normal supply; and then to deal strenuously and confidently with the protestors.
“The Iranian Government has, in recent weeks and months, been acquiring refined petroleum on the international market at an unprecedented rate, and has paid cash for the oil, rather than its traditional approach of offering crude oil in barter for refined oil.
“The Associated Press said on June 27, 2007, that “[t]he rationing is part of a Government attempt to reduce the $10-billion it spends each year to import fuel that is then sold to Iranian drivers at less than cost, to keep prices low.” Intelligence sources, however, indicate that this is not so: the Iranian Government has been increasing its spending on refined petroleum imports, particularly in recent months, but has been stockpiling the fuel for military use. Indeed, the fuel rationing now seems to be part of the process of ensuring that adequate stocks of refined petroleum are available for military purposes.
“The Iranian Government moves on stockpiling refined petroleum products parallel a variety of other indicators which show that Tehran is preparing for a worsening of the current international embargoes against the country to the point of war. It is also working extensively to overcome the international embargo on the provision of weapons to Iran through major deals being conducted via Syria, and pushing Syria itself — Iran’s principal regional ally, or surrogate — into preparation for conflict as well.
“Significantly, however, rifts in the Syrian leadership structure are also cause for concern in Tehran, but may, in fact, be contributory to the Syrian-Iranian preparations for external conflict as a means of bolstering support for the respective governments by their communities.
Quite apart from the divisions in the Iranian leadership (discussed below), and the division between the clerical ruling élite and the population itself, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad leadership ‘Alawite leadership group is itself becoming divided and rudderless in some respects, and is also facing a need to galvanize its population around a common cause.
“There seems to be a major breakdown within the ruling elements of the Assad family in Damascus. Essentially, the President, Dr Bashar al-Assad, and his brother-in-law, Assaf Shawqat, the Director of Military Intelligence, were, according to highly-placed sources, inclined to spark the region in order to “rally the troops behind the flag”. This accords with Tehran’s need to develop a united front to simultaneously confront the US and Israel.
“Significantly, however, even if Bashar was not inclined to work in concert with Tehran, his leadership is to a substantial extent predicted upon Tehran’s ability to blackmail the ‘Alawite leadership over the “legitimacy” of the ‘Alawites as a Shia sect. The April 1973 fatwa issued by the late (officially only “missing”) Imam Mussa Sadr certifying the ‘Alawites as Ja'afari Shi’ites. Because Sadr “disappeared” (killed by Libyan intelligence officers on the orders of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi), no replacement could be nominated (because of the Shi’ite obsession with occultation) and his legal archive was moved to the High Court in Qom, Iran. Hence, the certification of the ‘Alawites as Muslims is now beholden to the goodwill of the mullahs in Tehran, making the Assads of Damascus effectively hostages to this goodwill. Thus, talk in Washington about convincing Damascus to de-link from Tehran is wishful thinking.
“Moreover, the Bashar al-Assad Government is facing the increasing effectiveness and appeal of the leadership of the exiled uncle of the President, Rifaat al-Assad, who is seen as perhaps the only ‘Alawite leader who could have the strength to govern Syria without Iranian support, and even without the blessing and affirmation of the Shia leadership in Qom. He is, in other words, a national Syrian leader in his own right.
“But in order for the existing Syrian and Iranian leadership attempts to bolster and protect their rule against internal opposition, by promoting the idea of international threats to the countries, both Damascus and Tehran are building defense readiness. From June 18-21, 2007, Syrianair cancelled most of its scheduled air services and diverted aircraft into an airlift of weapons from Tehran to Damascus, with some of those weapons shipments going on to HizbAllah in Lebanon. As well, Iran Air and, reportedly, Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) aircraft were pressed into service to airlift military supplies from Tehran to Damascus (again, with some shipments moved by surface transport on to Lebanon for HizbAllah).
“At the same time, Syria reportedly took delivery in June 2007 of five MiG-31E advanced combat aircraft, and may have already begun accepting delivery of further MiG-29 variants — reportedly MiG-29M/M2s — for possible on-shipment to the IRIAF. The IIRAF already had some 25 Mikoyan MiG-29 and 15 two-seat MiG-29UB Fulcrum fighters in its inventory. The Syrian Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Arabiya as Souriya) had appr. 42 MiG-29A Fulcrum fighters, 14 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum air defense and air superiority aircraft, and six Mikoyan MiG-29UB Fulcrum operational trainers in its inventory. The MiG-31 is a development of the MiG-25 series, and it is reported that the MiG-29M/M2 is, in fact, similar in its subsystems and capabilities to the model being offered as the MiG-35 for the Indian Air Force. It is probable that Russia took back some of Syria’s older MiG-25 Foxbat high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft as trade-ins for the MiG-31Es. The MiG-31E is the export version of basic MiG-31 prototype (“903”), which was first noted in 1997; it has simplified systems over the MiG-35, with no active jammer, downgraded IFF, as well as downgraded radar and DASS. The Syrian Air Force has less than 15 Mikoyan MiG-25PD Foxbat air defense aircraft in its inventory; eight Mikoyan MiG-25RB reconnaissance; and two MiG-25RU Foxbat operational trainers.
“It is possible that Tehran and Damascus have been awaiting delivery of the advanced models of the MiG-25 and MiG-29 series before declaring readiness for a major, coordinated upsurge in confrontation with the US and Israel. Certainly, Syrian and Iranian aircrew and technicians have been undergoing training in Russia on the new systems.
“The use of Syria as a front for the purchase of advanced systems for Iran is not new. Even as recently as April-May 2007, it was reported that some of Syria’s 36 new Pantsir-S1E air defense systems were on-shipped to Iran.
“Meanwhile, it will be of key importance to note when the DPRK (North Korea) also begins steps to upgrade its confrontation, or return to a confrontational mode, with the US. This would indicate that the alliance of Iran, Syria, and the DPRK is ready to make moves, with the DPRK providing strategic diversion to an escalation in the Middle East.
“At the same time, however, the rifts within the clerical leadership are also coming to a head. There is a significant movement by former Pres. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who has found common cause with the “Supreme Leader”, “Ayatollah” Ali Hoseini-Khamene‘i, to attempt to work against Pres. Ahmadi-Nejad, who Rafsanjani is convinced is moving Iran too close to an unwinnable war with the US. Some Tehran sources indicate that Rafsanjani has already hinted to Saudi and US officials that he would, if he and Khamene‘i could remove Ahmadi-Nejad, begin a rapprochement with the US.
“This kind of leakage could, however, also be designed to cause the US to pull back from military confrontation with Iran, given the predilection in the US State Department to follow the recommendations of former Secretary of State James Baker to “normalize” US-Iranian relations, regardless of the fact that this would work against US long-term interests by perpetuating a radical clerical Administration in office in Iran. As one Tehran source said: “These so-called ayatollahs may all hate each other and scheme against each other, but the ‘reformers’ are now different from the hard-liners when it comes to power issues; they are both the same side of the same coin. The ‘reformers’ only allow women to have a less strict dress code, and may — as Rafsanjani is hinting — make the nuclear program less visible. But they still will foment terrorist activities; they will still work to use HizbAllah to destroy Israel. They are all the same.”
A second GIS report leaked to Levant Solutions, and dated July 31, 2007, was entitled Moving Toward a Confluence of Disruptive Events in the Middle East. That report noted:
“A diverse range of intelligence sources have highlighted a pattern of imminent upheaval across a wide area of the Middle East, expected to culminate during, and following, September 2007, involving (a) possible military action within Iraq to change the Government; and (b) renewed provocations against Israel by proxy forces in Lebanon (HizbAllah) and Gaza (HAMAS). The two issues are intrinsically related, but are being coordinated separately to some extent.
“The great strategic substance, however, is that these two events and others are coming together in a confluence of disruptive trends which will profoundly affect the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, and possibly also exacerbate the already worsening US-Russian relationship, given Moscow’s commitment to strong relations with Tehran (and, by default, Damascus) to help stabilize Russia’s southern flank.
“The upheavals could also give the Turkish General Staff the opportunity or casus belli it needs to openly intervene militarily in northern Turkey, ostensibly to protect its interests and to suppress activities there by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). But the chain of events was also likely to lead to a planned – and well-prepared – escalation by Iran and Syria to engage in activities both against Israel and to expand or preserve their access to and through Iraq.
“A move by some Iraqi military officials to change the Shi’a-dominated Government of Nouri Maliki – which is now cooperating closely and openly with the clerical Government of Iran, and deliberately resisting cooperation (insofar as possible) with the US – would not, ultimately, be viewed askance in Washington, which essentially now feels that the original US route to “democracy” in Iraq cannot be achieved rapidly enough to forestall an effective Iranian victory in Iraq. The comparisons with the November 1, 1963, coup against then-South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem are apparent, and have probably been considered in Washington, but the alternative – the continued slide of a Maliki-dominated Government toward Tehran – is clearly inimical to US interests.
“Significantly, and not surprisingly, Washington is not of one mind as to the possible moves against Prime Minister Maliki, and many in official Washington (including some of those who view Maliki with alarm) regarded the revelation by the Saudi Arabian Government in mid-July 2007 of evidence of Mr Maliki’s covert relationship with Tehran as merely evidence that Saudi Arabia wanted to supplant the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Government with a Sunni-dominated one. But GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs sources within a variety of Iraqi Government structures confirm that, whatever Riyadh’s motivations for revealing the intelligence documents showing the links between Maliki and Tehran, Prime Minister Maliki has indeed committed himself and his Administration to follow the Iranian clerics’ instructions.
“At the same time, as noted in late June by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs, the Iranian and Syrian governments now appear to have completed their preparations for resumed open conflict against Israel,1 initiating through HizbAllah and HAMAS as fairly transparent proxies, in a process designed to lead to an escalation into more direct Syrian (and, perhaps, eventually Iranian) military involvement in conflict against Israel, while Iran attempts to use its present asset base in Iraq to stop an Iraqi nationalist military backlash designed to replace Maliki. The entire process presages an escalation of conflict in Iraq at the same time that the pressure resumes against Israel. Indeed, the resumption of activities against Israel – seen as a primary goal by HizbAllah and HAMAS, and the Syrian leadership around Bashar al-Assad – is almost viewed as a cover operation by Tehran.
“This follows the essential failure of, and the lessons learned from, the Israeli-HizbAllah conflict which began on July 12, 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect on August 14, 2006. While that conflict was – correctly in some respects – perceived as an Israeli military and diplomatic failure, it was also insufficiently successful from an Iranian/Syrian perspective to be escalated into a more general conflict.
“And while Bashar al-Assad and his key advisors are pressing for a more “heroic” Syrian war with Israel, in order to consolidate the otherwise weakening position of Bashar in Damascus2, the Turkish military leadership is itself is viewing how best it might reverse what it considers to be an undesirable outcome to the July 22, 2007, Parliamentary election which confirmed the Islamist dominance of the Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi).
[Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s election win was a landslide for AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Justice and Development Party), giving the incumbent party 46.6 percent of the national vote and 340 seats in the Turkish Assembly. It was the first time in half a century that an incumbent party increased its vote.]
“The Turkish General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanları: TAF) had given the impression that it would have liked to have escalated the military situation with regard to northern Iraq before the Parliamentary election, possibly in the hope of being able to forestall the election through the creation of a “national emergency”: constitutional grounds for election deferment. Now it may still seek to redress the political situation inside Turkey by availing itself of an increasingly unstable situation in the northern parts of Iraq – in which not only are the Iraqi Turkmen now under direct and sustained pressure from the major Kurdish tribes, the Talibani and Barzani, but there is, in any event, growing sectarian conflict – to act. This may have the added benefit of forestalling – or acting as a cautionary note on – the next major Turkish vote: for the Presidency.
“The Grand National Assembly was due to meet on August 4, 2007, with its principal mission to choose a successor for the strongly secular outgoing President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who has been a fierce critic of the AKP. The AKP now has the strength to guarantee that its nominee for the Presidency, outgoing Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, a committed Islamist, can win the Presidency. Unless the TAF moves soon to regain control, its authority and power will continue to be eroded, and yet Turkey’s position on entry into the European Union (EU) will still essentially be unattainable.
“But in many respects a possible Turkish intervention in northern Iraq – which would have significant, long-lasting effects, and which the US Government is anxious to avoid – is the smaller part of the equation. A nationalist military coup in Iraq – which could only be conducted by the Turkish Army Special Forces; the Army as a whole is too Shi’a and too difficult to weld into an anti-Maliki force – is something which the Iranian clerics in Tehran fear and are prepared to oppose. Indeed, the key figure ostensibly involved in the potential coup is a general who has not been seen for at least two years, so concerned are the anti-Maliki figures with ensuring the safety of the proposed event.
“This is not the first time rumors of a possible coup against the Maliki Government have surfaced. But Baghdad sources cite a significant number of indicators that this might be the time – if it was ever to occur – that it would have a chance of success. If not now, then the Iranian-sponsored groups, supported inside Iraq by actual Iranian special forces personnel, would grow sufficiently strong to prevent such an occurrence.
“Moreover, the Iranian Government is certainly better-equipped to understand what is going on inside the Iraqi Army and Government than is the US Government. Virtually none of the massive US Embassy staff in Baghdad speaks Arabic; most State Department and military personnel – and even Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel – turn over too rapidly to acquire any real historical knowledge or deep contacts, and yet they dismiss any attempts to provide input, presumably for fear of being misled. Meanwhile, the Iranian intelligence service, an element of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar: VEVAK), has been directly observed by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs field operatives to control at least one key brothel (and almost certainly many more) in Baghdad, frequented by US officials based in the city. Moreover, all of the women working in the facility speak only Farsi, not Arabic, and stay in situ only a few days before being “rotated out” with their intelligence take, to be replaced by fresh girls.
“This confirms the obvious: that Tehran is engaged in a massive intelligence operation inside Iraq, and has the tools to do it well. The lack of even a basic language capability in the US Embassy in Baghdad confirms that the few US Army intelligence officers engaged “at the coal face”, working with Iraqi police and military units, are being pressed too hard to deliver intelligence and, at the same time, are not believed – or are ignored – at higher levels of the US policy structure. This, in essence, confirms what was said in a speech to a US Army Command & General Staff College course on May 27, 2007:
“The speech noted: “[W]ith Washington in the mode of thinking that all that matters is ‘how the war plays in Washington’ or the media, it is not surprising that the bureaucracies have failed to sense that what is underway in Iraq and Afghanistan are wars in which survival is at stake. Not only the long-term survival of the West, which can be rationalized away as a long-term thing, and not immediately pressing, but also the survival of those who fight against the Coalition, who have a far greater sense of urgency than does Washington about how they fight the wars. And they are fighting for survival, which means that they [Iran and Syria] are taking the war more seriously than the Western public.”3
“The trends toward pivotal action in the region by any of the key players – the Iraqi coup planners, the Iranian clerical leadership, the increasingly isolated Syrian President, and the Turkish General Staff – will depend on how much will they have. The Turkish General Staff, for example, failed to forestall the re-election of the Islamist Government on July 22, 2007, and may be unable to prevent the election to the Presidency of Foreign Minister Gul. Syria and Iran, both, have demonstrated a strong commitment to supporting proxy war against Israel and the US in the past, but have almost prayed that Israel or the US would start direct conflict against them. Will Tehran and Damascus have the will now to do what they have prepared so long to do?
“The US, essentially, is doing nothing. It has not used well the time which continuing the conflict has bought, and the gradual successes on the ground under the generalship of Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I), is insufficient to meet US strategic needs, which are essentially driven by the timetable of Washington, and particularly the 2008 US Presidential election. The US, then, has no option but to hope that its increasingly fractious relationship with Prime Minister al-Maliki is ended by Maliki’s ouster. Certainly, the US is doing nothing to support the Iranian population in removing the Iranian leadership through a psychological strategy campaign, and nor is it doing anything to effectively, and carefully, replace Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, and put in place a leader who would break with Tehran (and make peace with Israel), such as Rifa’at al-Assad.
“GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Senior Editor Yossef Bodansky, writing in a prescient March 20, 2006, Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis report entitled As Syrian Government-in-Exile About to Form, the Battle is Joined Between Utopianism and Islamism on the One Hand, and Strategic Interests on the Other, noted:
“The only viable alternative to the sustenance of Bashar’s reign or the Khaddam-Bayanouni alliance4 is the resurrection of the traditional alliance of the minorities and the urban élite blocs on the basis of economic liberalization in, and modernization of, Syria. This has long been the position of Dr Rifa’at al-Assad and the traditional elements of the minorities bloc leadership he represents. The ascent to power in Damascus of a Rifa’at-led alliance would also further the strategic interests of the US as he has repeatedly promised to stop the Syrian sponsorship of terrorism and insurgencies against all of Syria’s neighbors. Presently, Rifa’at al-Assad is besieged by representatives of both leading minority and urban élite families to continue to challenge Bashar and return to power in Damascus.
“But the US seems to have no coherent policy toward Syria, urging simply “democracy” in Syria.
Meanwhile, the US’ only option seems, on the one hand, to be to threaten direct military action against Iran by deploying two highly-vulnerable carrier battle groups (and possibly now a third) into the Arabian Sea, or, on the other hand, to promote the prospect of bilateral negotiations with the Iranian clerics (the plan by US former Secretary of State James Baker, seen in Tehran as a sign of surrender by the US). This begs the question, then, as to whether the US has a coherent strategy with regard to Iraq. Certainly, Tehran and Damascus do.
“And the al-Maliki Government also seems to have made a firm commitment toward joining the Tehran-Damascus alliance. Senior al-Maliki advisors have made a point of visiting Damascus recently, and taking large cases of cash with them. Beneath the ideology, this is something which the key leaders in Damascus, Tehran, and Baghdad understand: cash, and the retention of power and privilege. Those in power in both Damascus and Tehran know that their support bases are shaky, which is why both require conflict to galvanize public support around the “state” (ie: the leadership).
“That the Iranian clerics are unrepresentative of the Iranian population has long been evident, which is why most critics of the Iraq Study Group recommendations, led by former US Secretary of State James Baker, believe that Washington-Tehran negotiations merely strengthen the anti-Western clerics and undermine the position of the essentially pro-Western Iranian population.
“The US-based blog-site, Anti-Mullah5, run by experienced, Farsi-speaking security expert Alan Peters, noted on July 29, 2007: “Recent polls from inside and outside Iran indicate that 92 percent of the Iranian population is against this regime[,] but for whom should they rise up? For whom should they overthrow the Mullahs? And get what in exchange?”
“Peters went on to note:
“Having examined all aspects of the situation on the ground to the extent to which I am privy, the West has to have two main goals:
“1. To put their backing behind two or more of Iran's major tribes, like the Qashghai and Bakhtiari, perhaps in combination with the Boyer-Ahmadi, which all have tribal borders with each other. And oil rich Khuzestan.
“2. To constitutionally establish a separation of church and state (the tribes will not object as they hate the Mullahs so badly they will enjoy poking the secular stick into their eye).
Reason? The Mullahs wanted and tried and pushed to replace the traditional tribal leaders (Khans) with a Mullah appointed by Tehran. To the extent of executing some of those same leaders, notably from the Qashghai tribe.
“At the same time, while most Iranian opposition leaders are falling by the wayside through lack of credibility, at least one, the nationalist leader of the overarching Azadegan movement, Dr Assad Homayoun, has retained respect by refusing to accept financial support by anyone other than Iranians, and by supporting the approach that the tribal and regional groups should work toward a secular state, and has also worked toward the theory that the Iranian Armed Forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC: Pasdaran) should remove support for the clerics and support a popular movement aimed at introducing secular governance, even if temporarily under military leadership.
“Meanwhile, reinforcing the reports that the situation inside Iraq is transforming toward a possible nationalist military coup, reliable Baghdad sources noted that, on July 31, 2007, nine senior Iraqi Army generals collectively submitted their resignations to the Iraqi General Staff, ostensibly protesting both the al-Maliki Iraqi Government and the US Government, citing “the conduct of the state by the US occupiers and the Iraqi Government”. The complex chain of events and their strategic ramifications thus appeared, as at July 31, 2007, to be well in motion.
“Footnotes:
1. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, June 30, 2007: Iran, Syria Make Strenuous Preparations for Combat-Readiness, Partly Reflecting Major Internal Leadership Schisms.
2. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, July 3, 2007: Syria’s Inner Circle Fractures.
3. Toward Victory in the New Cold War. An Address by Gregory R. Copley to the US Army Command & General Staff College, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, May 21, 2007. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, May 21, 2007.
4. Ali Saad-al-din Bayanouni is the secretary-general of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), now in exile in London. Abdel-Halim Khaddam, a Sunni Shamari from Abu-Kamal on the Syrian-Iraqi border area, was Vice-President of Syria under Bashar al-Assad. As Bodansky noted in the March 20, 2006, report: “The majority rule which Khaddam and Bayanouni are offering, and Arab governments support, is an alliance of the two Sunni blocs — the urban élite and predominantly Islamist-jihadist rural blocs — against the minorities bloc. Khaddam can keep Bayanouni and the Ikhwani on his side only if he promises to ensure the Islamic character of the government, something which is not conducive to development of real democracy or economic empowerment, and, most important, out-perform Bashar in providing support for the Islamist-jihadist insurrection in Iraq and against Israel (which gains the Syrian Government Tehran’s support and all-important free oil); hardly a contribution to the US strategic interests in Iraq and throughout the Middle East.”
5. http://noiri.blogspot.com/2007/07/god-is-being-removed-and-replaced-by.html
Syria now determines the degree of flexibility and opportunism available to the Iranian clerics. Syria, under Iran’s captive, Bashar al-Assad, determines how the Iraq turmoil will play out.
The Iranian clerics have only a couple of interrelated strategic options to break out from their strategic isolation and to win protection from an uprising of their own people: the first is to sell their soul and their country to Moscow and Beijing by embracing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of ducking under the mutual defense clauses of the SCO. The second is to use the clerics’ longstanding control of the Syrian leadership to break out of the physical containment by using Syrian assets to stimulate the civil war in Iraq, and to open the prospect that Iran – after the US and Coalition have withdrawn from Iraq – can literally dominate the land from Iran to the Mediterranean.
Syria is essentially controlled by the Iranian clerics, for reasons outlined below. But Syria is now critical to the survival of the ruling Iranian mullahs’, as much as Bashar owes his political survival to Tehran. Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, had a comfortable arrangement with Tehran’s mullahs, but Bashar, who lacks any kind of independent power base, is now virtually in office at the sufferance of Tehran. And, as a result, Syria’s economy and social base continues to decline. Frustrations abound, and Bashar’s only option is to support the Iranian plan to move toward regional war as a means of distracting and suppressing the Syrian people.
High-blown rhetoric from Damascus and Tehran implies that a major rift exists between the Syrian and Iranian peoples and the US and Israel. The reality is that the rhetoric is designed to literally create a crisis as the only means the Syrian and Iranian leaders have to stop their own populations maneuvering against them.
Significantly, the Western media and foreign policy “experts” keep taking at face value what Bashar and his cohorts, and what the clerics in Tehran, are saying. And Washington is divided, when it comes to Iran, between whether to bomb or to talk. The answer, from the people in Syria and Iran, is that they should do neither. They should neither legitimize the clerics or Bashar by doing deals which are meaningless and which only serve to perpetuate their unrepresentative rule. And they should not bomb, because this would merely force the Syrian and Iranian peoples – essentially pro-Western and awaiting their liberty – to reluctantly rally around the leaders they despise in the face of foreign threats to their homeland.
What, then, is the answer?
It is the more challenging, and yet least damaging, option: to maneuver politically; to use indirect support for the populations of Syria and Iran to achieve a better life. Asian martial arts use the term “give in to win” to describe the tactic of using the inherent momentum of an adversary to defeat him, rather than attacking with one’s own thrust. For the West to win in Syria and Iran, it must use the inherent momentum of the local populations and true leaderships, which have long been suppressed.
Levant Solutions has been given access by concerned officials to a series of special reports which had been distributed to US Government and officials of other governments by the Global Information System (GIS), highlighting the situation with regard to Syria. They highlight the reality which we on the ground in the country already know: that Bashar al-Assad is maneuvering not to achieve peace, or the betterment of Syria, but to actively join with Iran in a war against Israel and the West, so that he can attempt to win the support of the Syrian people, as his father, Hafez al-Assad, did in earlier wars.
In order to do this, Bashar has sold Syria to the Iranian clerics, who use Damascus as a means of furthering their wars in Iraq, and against Syria, and in Lebanon. And through all of this, they hope to build their landbridge to the Mediterranean, which would make them a global power. And this, coupled with the new alliance which the Iranian mullahs have created with Moscow and Beijing, would make the next Cold War far more dangerous for the West than the last. In it all, the peoples of the Levant and the Middle East generally would be unable to achieve the peace they want.
On June 30, 2007, in a Special Report, GIS advised senior US Government officials, in a report entitled Iran, Syria Make Strenuous Preparations for Combat-Readiness, Partly Reflecting Major Internal Leadership Schisms, that a pattern of Iranian and Syrian cooperation was emerging which indicated intensive preparations for imminent hostilities, even in the face of — and perhaps even because of — growing public unrest within their societies. The report went on:
“The June 26-27, 2007, gasoline rationing riots which struck Tehran and other major Iranian cities were perceived by Western media analysts to highlight the weakness of the Iranian clerical Government of Pres. Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad. In fact, more detailed intelligence shows that the clerical leadership not only anticipated the Iranian public unrest over petroleum rationing; that it had adequate reserves of refined petroleum and chose not only not to release these reserves to the public but rather to further ration normal supply; and then to deal strenuously and confidently with the protestors.
“The Iranian Government has, in recent weeks and months, been acquiring refined petroleum on the international market at an unprecedented rate, and has paid cash for the oil, rather than its traditional approach of offering crude oil in barter for refined oil.
“The Associated Press said on June 27, 2007, that “[t]he rationing is part of a Government attempt to reduce the $10-billion it spends each year to import fuel that is then sold to Iranian drivers at less than cost, to keep prices low.” Intelligence sources, however, indicate that this is not so: the Iranian Government has been increasing its spending on refined petroleum imports, particularly in recent months, but has been stockpiling the fuel for military use. Indeed, the fuel rationing now seems to be part of the process of ensuring that adequate stocks of refined petroleum are available for military purposes.
“The Iranian Government moves on stockpiling refined petroleum products parallel a variety of other indicators which show that Tehran is preparing for a worsening of the current international embargoes against the country to the point of war. It is also working extensively to overcome the international embargo on the provision of weapons to Iran through major deals being conducted via Syria, and pushing Syria itself — Iran’s principal regional ally, or surrogate — into preparation for conflict as well.
“Significantly, however, rifts in the Syrian leadership structure are also cause for concern in Tehran, but may, in fact, be contributory to the Syrian-Iranian preparations for external conflict as a means of bolstering support for the respective governments by their communities.
Quite apart from the divisions in the Iranian leadership (discussed below), and the division between the clerical ruling élite and the population itself, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad leadership ‘Alawite leadership group is itself becoming divided and rudderless in some respects, and is also facing a need to galvanize its population around a common cause.
“There seems to be a major breakdown within the ruling elements of the Assad family in Damascus. Essentially, the President, Dr Bashar al-Assad, and his brother-in-law, Assaf Shawqat, the Director of Military Intelligence, were, according to highly-placed sources, inclined to spark the region in order to “rally the troops behind the flag”. This accords with Tehran’s need to develop a united front to simultaneously confront the US and Israel.
“Significantly, however, even if Bashar was not inclined to work in concert with Tehran, his leadership is to a substantial extent predicted upon Tehran’s ability to blackmail the ‘Alawite leadership over the “legitimacy” of the ‘Alawites as a Shia sect. The April 1973 fatwa issued by the late (officially only “missing”) Imam Mussa Sadr certifying the ‘Alawites as Ja'afari Shi’ites. Because Sadr “disappeared” (killed by Libyan intelligence officers on the orders of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi), no replacement could be nominated (because of the Shi’ite obsession with occultation) and his legal archive was moved to the High Court in Qom, Iran. Hence, the certification of the ‘Alawites as Muslims is now beholden to the goodwill of the mullahs in Tehran, making the Assads of Damascus effectively hostages to this goodwill. Thus, talk in Washington about convincing Damascus to de-link from Tehran is wishful thinking.
“Moreover, the Bashar al-Assad Government is facing the increasing effectiveness and appeal of the leadership of the exiled uncle of the President, Rifaat al-Assad, who is seen as perhaps the only ‘Alawite leader who could have the strength to govern Syria without Iranian support, and even without the blessing and affirmation of the Shia leadership in Qom. He is, in other words, a national Syrian leader in his own right.
“But in order for the existing Syrian and Iranian leadership attempts to bolster and protect their rule against internal opposition, by promoting the idea of international threats to the countries, both Damascus and Tehran are building defense readiness. From June 18-21, 2007, Syrianair cancelled most of its scheduled air services and diverted aircraft into an airlift of weapons from Tehran to Damascus, with some of those weapons shipments going on to HizbAllah in Lebanon. As well, Iran Air and, reportedly, Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) aircraft were pressed into service to airlift military supplies from Tehran to Damascus (again, with some shipments moved by surface transport on to Lebanon for HizbAllah).
“At the same time, Syria reportedly took delivery in June 2007 of five MiG-31E advanced combat aircraft, and may have already begun accepting delivery of further MiG-29 variants — reportedly MiG-29M/M2s — for possible on-shipment to the IRIAF. The IIRAF already had some 25 Mikoyan MiG-29 and 15 two-seat MiG-29UB Fulcrum fighters in its inventory. The Syrian Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Arabiya as Souriya) had appr. 42 MiG-29A Fulcrum fighters, 14 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum air defense and air superiority aircraft, and six Mikoyan MiG-29UB Fulcrum operational trainers in its inventory. The MiG-31 is a development of the MiG-25 series, and it is reported that the MiG-29M/M2 is, in fact, similar in its subsystems and capabilities to the model being offered as the MiG-35 for the Indian Air Force. It is probable that Russia took back some of Syria’s older MiG-25 Foxbat high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft as trade-ins for the MiG-31Es. The MiG-31E is the export version of basic MiG-31 prototype (“903”), which was first noted in 1997; it has simplified systems over the MiG-35, with no active jammer, downgraded IFF, as well as downgraded radar and DASS. The Syrian Air Force has less than 15 Mikoyan MiG-25PD Foxbat air defense aircraft in its inventory; eight Mikoyan MiG-25RB reconnaissance; and two MiG-25RU Foxbat operational trainers.
“It is possible that Tehran and Damascus have been awaiting delivery of the advanced models of the MiG-25 and MiG-29 series before declaring readiness for a major, coordinated upsurge in confrontation with the US and Israel. Certainly, Syrian and Iranian aircrew and technicians have been undergoing training in Russia on the new systems.
“The use of Syria as a front for the purchase of advanced systems for Iran is not new. Even as recently as April-May 2007, it was reported that some of Syria’s 36 new Pantsir-S1E air defense systems were on-shipped to Iran.
“Meanwhile, it will be of key importance to note when the DPRK (North Korea) also begins steps to upgrade its confrontation, or return to a confrontational mode, with the US. This would indicate that the alliance of Iran, Syria, and the DPRK is ready to make moves, with the DPRK providing strategic diversion to an escalation in the Middle East.
“At the same time, however, the rifts within the clerical leadership are also coming to a head. There is a significant movement by former Pres. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who has found common cause with the “Supreme Leader”, “Ayatollah” Ali Hoseini-Khamene‘i, to attempt to work against Pres. Ahmadi-Nejad, who Rafsanjani is convinced is moving Iran too close to an unwinnable war with the US. Some Tehran sources indicate that Rafsanjani has already hinted to Saudi and US officials that he would, if he and Khamene‘i could remove Ahmadi-Nejad, begin a rapprochement with the US.
“This kind of leakage could, however, also be designed to cause the US to pull back from military confrontation with Iran, given the predilection in the US State Department to follow the recommendations of former Secretary of State James Baker to “normalize” US-Iranian relations, regardless of the fact that this would work against US long-term interests by perpetuating a radical clerical Administration in office in Iran. As one Tehran source said: “These so-called ayatollahs may all hate each other and scheme against each other, but the ‘reformers’ are now different from the hard-liners when it comes to power issues; they are both the same side of the same coin. The ‘reformers’ only allow women to have a less strict dress code, and may — as Rafsanjani is hinting — make the nuclear program less visible. But they still will foment terrorist activities; they will still work to use HizbAllah to destroy Israel. They are all the same.”
A second GIS report leaked to Levant Solutions, and dated July 31, 2007, was entitled Moving Toward a Confluence of Disruptive Events in the Middle East. That report noted:
“A diverse range of intelligence sources have highlighted a pattern of imminent upheaval across a wide area of the Middle East, expected to culminate during, and following, September 2007, involving (a) possible military action within Iraq to change the Government; and (b) renewed provocations against Israel by proxy forces in Lebanon (HizbAllah) and Gaza (HAMAS). The two issues are intrinsically related, but are being coordinated separately to some extent.
“The great strategic substance, however, is that these two events and others are coming together in a confluence of disruptive trends which will profoundly affect the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, and possibly also exacerbate the already worsening US-Russian relationship, given Moscow’s commitment to strong relations with Tehran (and, by default, Damascus) to help stabilize Russia’s southern flank.
“The upheavals could also give the Turkish General Staff the opportunity or casus belli it needs to openly intervene militarily in northern Turkey, ostensibly to protect its interests and to suppress activities there by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). But the chain of events was also likely to lead to a planned – and well-prepared – escalation by Iran and Syria to engage in activities both against Israel and to expand or preserve their access to and through Iraq.
“A move by some Iraqi military officials to change the Shi’a-dominated Government of Nouri Maliki – which is now cooperating closely and openly with the clerical Government of Iran, and deliberately resisting cooperation (insofar as possible) with the US – would not, ultimately, be viewed askance in Washington, which essentially now feels that the original US route to “democracy” in Iraq cannot be achieved rapidly enough to forestall an effective Iranian victory in Iraq. The comparisons with the November 1, 1963, coup against then-South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem are apparent, and have probably been considered in Washington, but the alternative – the continued slide of a Maliki-dominated Government toward Tehran – is clearly inimical to US interests.
“Significantly, and not surprisingly, Washington is not of one mind as to the possible moves against Prime Minister Maliki, and many in official Washington (including some of those who view Maliki with alarm) regarded the revelation by the Saudi Arabian Government in mid-July 2007 of evidence of Mr Maliki’s covert relationship with Tehran as merely evidence that Saudi Arabia wanted to supplant the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Government with a Sunni-dominated one. But GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs sources within a variety of Iraqi Government structures confirm that, whatever Riyadh’s motivations for revealing the intelligence documents showing the links between Maliki and Tehran, Prime Minister Maliki has indeed committed himself and his Administration to follow the Iranian clerics’ instructions.
“At the same time, as noted in late June by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs, the Iranian and Syrian governments now appear to have completed their preparations for resumed open conflict against Israel,1 initiating through HizbAllah and HAMAS as fairly transparent proxies, in a process designed to lead to an escalation into more direct Syrian (and, perhaps, eventually Iranian) military involvement in conflict against Israel, while Iran attempts to use its present asset base in Iraq to stop an Iraqi nationalist military backlash designed to replace Maliki. The entire process presages an escalation of conflict in Iraq at the same time that the pressure resumes against Israel. Indeed, the resumption of activities against Israel – seen as a primary goal by HizbAllah and HAMAS, and the Syrian leadership around Bashar al-Assad – is almost viewed as a cover operation by Tehran.
“This follows the essential failure of, and the lessons learned from, the Israeli-HizbAllah conflict which began on July 12, 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect on August 14, 2006. While that conflict was – correctly in some respects – perceived as an Israeli military and diplomatic failure, it was also insufficiently successful from an Iranian/Syrian perspective to be escalated into a more general conflict.
“And while Bashar al-Assad and his key advisors are pressing for a more “heroic” Syrian war with Israel, in order to consolidate the otherwise weakening position of Bashar in Damascus2, the Turkish military leadership is itself is viewing how best it might reverse what it considers to be an undesirable outcome to the July 22, 2007, Parliamentary election which confirmed the Islamist dominance of the Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi).
[Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s election win was a landslide for AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Justice and Development Party), giving the incumbent party 46.6 percent of the national vote and 340 seats in the Turkish Assembly. It was the first time in half a century that an incumbent party increased its vote.]
“The Turkish General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanları: TAF) had given the impression that it would have liked to have escalated the military situation with regard to northern Iraq before the Parliamentary election, possibly in the hope of being able to forestall the election through the creation of a “national emergency”: constitutional grounds for election deferment. Now it may still seek to redress the political situation inside Turkey by availing itself of an increasingly unstable situation in the northern parts of Iraq – in which not only are the Iraqi Turkmen now under direct and sustained pressure from the major Kurdish tribes, the Talibani and Barzani, but there is, in any event, growing sectarian conflict – to act. This may have the added benefit of forestalling – or acting as a cautionary note on – the next major Turkish vote: for the Presidency.
“The Grand National Assembly was due to meet on August 4, 2007, with its principal mission to choose a successor for the strongly secular outgoing President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who has been a fierce critic of the AKP. The AKP now has the strength to guarantee that its nominee for the Presidency, outgoing Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, a committed Islamist, can win the Presidency. Unless the TAF moves soon to regain control, its authority and power will continue to be eroded, and yet Turkey’s position on entry into the European Union (EU) will still essentially be unattainable.
“But in many respects a possible Turkish intervention in northern Iraq – which would have significant, long-lasting effects, and which the US Government is anxious to avoid – is the smaller part of the equation. A nationalist military coup in Iraq – which could only be conducted by the Turkish Army Special Forces; the Army as a whole is too Shi’a and too difficult to weld into an anti-Maliki force – is something which the Iranian clerics in Tehran fear and are prepared to oppose. Indeed, the key figure ostensibly involved in the potential coup is a general who has not been seen for at least two years, so concerned are the anti-Maliki figures with ensuring the safety of the proposed event.
“This is not the first time rumors of a possible coup against the Maliki Government have surfaced. But Baghdad sources cite a significant number of indicators that this might be the time – if it was ever to occur – that it would have a chance of success. If not now, then the Iranian-sponsored groups, supported inside Iraq by actual Iranian special forces personnel, would grow sufficiently strong to prevent such an occurrence.
“Moreover, the Iranian Government is certainly better-equipped to understand what is going on inside the Iraqi Army and Government than is the US Government. Virtually none of the massive US Embassy staff in Baghdad speaks Arabic; most State Department and military personnel – and even Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel – turn over too rapidly to acquire any real historical knowledge or deep contacts, and yet they dismiss any attempts to provide input, presumably for fear of being misled. Meanwhile, the Iranian intelligence service, an element of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar: VEVAK), has been directly observed by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs field operatives to control at least one key brothel (and almost certainly many more) in Baghdad, frequented by US officials based in the city. Moreover, all of the women working in the facility speak only Farsi, not Arabic, and stay in situ only a few days before being “rotated out” with their intelligence take, to be replaced by fresh girls.
“This confirms the obvious: that Tehran is engaged in a massive intelligence operation inside Iraq, and has the tools to do it well. The lack of even a basic language capability in the US Embassy in Baghdad confirms that the few US Army intelligence officers engaged “at the coal face”, working with Iraqi police and military units, are being pressed too hard to deliver intelligence and, at the same time, are not believed – or are ignored – at higher levels of the US policy structure. This, in essence, confirms what was said in a speech to a US Army Command & General Staff College course on May 27, 2007:
“The speech noted: “[W]ith Washington in the mode of thinking that all that matters is ‘how the war plays in Washington’ or the media, it is not surprising that the bureaucracies have failed to sense that what is underway in Iraq and Afghanistan are wars in which survival is at stake. Not only the long-term survival of the West, which can be rationalized away as a long-term thing, and not immediately pressing, but also the survival of those who fight against the Coalition, who have a far greater sense of urgency than does Washington about how they fight the wars. And they are fighting for survival, which means that they [Iran and Syria] are taking the war more seriously than the Western public.”3
“The trends toward pivotal action in the region by any of the key players – the Iraqi coup planners, the Iranian clerical leadership, the increasingly isolated Syrian President, and the Turkish General Staff – will depend on how much will they have. The Turkish General Staff, for example, failed to forestall the re-election of the Islamist Government on July 22, 2007, and may be unable to prevent the election to the Presidency of Foreign Minister Gul. Syria and Iran, both, have demonstrated a strong commitment to supporting proxy war against Israel and the US in the past, but have almost prayed that Israel or the US would start direct conflict against them. Will Tehran and Damascus have the will now to do what they have prepared so long to do?
“The US, essentially, is doing nothing. It has not used well the time which continuing the conflict has bought, and the gradual successes on the ground under the generalship of Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I), is insufficient to meet US strategic needs, which are essentially driven by the timetable of Washington, and particularly the 2008 US Presidential election. The US, then, has no option but to hope that its increasingly fractious relationship with Prime Minister al-Maliki is ended by Maliki’s ouster. Certainly, the US is doing nothing to support the Iranian population in removing the Iranian leadership through a psychological strategy campaign, and nor is it doing anything to effectively, and carefully, replace Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, and put in place a leader who would break with Tehran (and make peace with Israel), such as Rifa’at al-Assad.
“GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Senior Editor Yossef Bodansky, writing in a prescient March 20, 2006, Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis report entitled As Syrian Government-in-Exile About to Form, the Battle is Joined Between Utopianism and Islamism on the One Hand, and Strategic Interests on the Other, noted:
“The only viable alternative to the sustenance of Bashar’s reign or the Khaddam-Bayanouni alliance4 is the resurrection of the traditional alliance of the minorities and the urban élite blocs on the basis of economic liberalization in, and modernization of, Syria. This has long been the position of Dr Rifa’at al-Assad and the traditional elements of the minorities bloc leadership he represents. The ascent to power in Damascus of a Rifa’at-led alliance would also further the strategic interests of the US as he has repeatedly promised to stop the Syrian sponsorship of terrorism and insurgencies against all of Syria’s neighbors. Presently, Rifa’at al-Assad is besieged by representatives of both leading minority and urban élite families to continue to challenge Bashar and return to power in Damascus.
“But the US seems to have no coherent policy toward Syria, urging simply “democracy” in Syria.
Meanwhile, the US’ only option seems, on the one hand, to be to threaten direct military action against Iran by deploying two highly-vulnerable carrier battle groups (and possibly now a third) into the Arabian Sea, or, on the other hand, to promote the prospect of bilateral negotiations with the Iranian clerics (the plan by US former Secretary of State James Baker, seen in Tehran as a sign of surrender by the US). This begs the question, then, as to whether the US has a coherent strategy with regard to Iraq. Certainly, Tehran and Damascus do.
“And the al-Maliki Government also seems to have made a firm commitment toward joining the Tehran-Damascus alliance. Senior al-Maliki advisors have made a point of visiting Damascus recently, and taking large cases of cash with them. Beneath the ideology, this is something which the key leaders in Damascus, Tehran, and Baghdad understand: cash, and the retention of power and privilege. Those in power in both Damascus and Tehran know that their support bases are shaky, which is why both require conflict to galvanize public support around the “state” (ie: the leadership).
“That the Iranian clerics are unrepresentative of the Iranian population has long been evident, which is why most critics of the Iraq Study Group recommendations, led by former US Secretary of State James Baker, believe that Washington-Tehran negotiations merely strengthen the anti-Western clerics and undermine the position of the essentially pro-Western Iranian population.
“The US-based blog-site, Anti-Mullah5, run by experienced, Farsi-speaking security expert Alan Peters, noted on July 29, 2007: “Recent polls from inside and outside Iran indicate that 92 percent of the Iranian population is against this regime[,] but for whom should they rise up? For whom should they overthrow the Mullahs? And get what in exchange?”
“Peters went on to note:
“Having examined all aspects of the situation on the ground to the extent to which I am privy, the West has to have two main goals:
“1. To put their backing behind two or more of Iran's major tribes, like the Qashghai and Bakhtiari, perhaps in combination with the Boyer-Ahmadi, which all have tribal borders with each other. And oil rich Khuzestan.
“2. To constitutionally establish a separation of church and state (the tribes will not object as they hate the Mullahs so badly they will enjoy poking the secular stick into their eye).
Reason? The Mullahs wanted and tried and pushed to replace the traditional tribal leaders (Khans) with a Mullah appointed by Tehran. To the extent of executing some of those same leaders, notably from the Qashghai tribe.
“At the same time, while most Iranian opposition leaders are falling by the wayside through lack of credibility, at least one, the nationalist leader of the overarching Azadegan movement, Dr Assad Homayoun, has retained respect by refusing to accept financial support by anyone other than Iranians, and by supporting the approach that the tribal and regional groups should work toward a secular state, and has also worked toward the theory that the Iranian Armed Forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC: Pasdaran) should remove support for the clerics and support a popular movement aimed at introducing secular governance, even if temporarily under military leadership.
“Meanwhile, reinforcing the reports that the situation inside Iraq is transforming toward a possible nationalist military coup, reliable Baghdad sources noted that, on July 31, 2007, nine senior Iraqi Army generals collectively submitted their resignations to the Iraqi General Staff, ostensibly protesting both the al-Maliki Iraqi Government and the US Government, citing “the conduct of the state by the US occupiers and the Iraqi Government”. The complex chain of events and their strategic ramifications thus appeared, as at July 31, 2007, to be well in motion.
“Footnotes:
1. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, June 30, 2007: Iran, Syria Make Strenuous Preparations for Combat-Readiness, Partly Reflecting Major Internal Leadership Schisms.
2. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, July 3, 2007: Syria’s Inner Circle Fractures.
3. Toward Victory in the New Cold War. An Address by Gregory R. Copley to the US Army Command & General Staff College, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, May 21, 2007. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, May 21, 2007.
4. Ali Saad-al-din Bayanouni is the secretary-general of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), now in exile in London. Abdel-Halim Khaddam, a Sunni Shamari from Abu-Kamal on the Syrian-Iraqi border area, was Vice-President of Syria under Bashar al-Assad. As Bodansky noted in the March 20, 2006, report: “The majority rule which Khaddam and Bayanouni are offering, and Arab governments support, is an alliance of the two Sunni blocs — the urban élite and predominantly Islamist-jihadist rural blocs — against the minorities bloc. Khaddam can keep Bayanouni and the Ikhwani on his side only if he promises to ensure the Islamic character of the government, something which is not conducive to development of real democracy or economic empowerment, and, most important, out-perform Bashar in providing support for the Islamist-jihadist insurrection in Iraq and against Israel (which gains the Syrian Government Tehran’s support and all-important free oil); hardly a contribution to the US strategic interests in Iraq and throughout the Middle East.”
5. http://noiri.blogspot.com/2007/07/god-is-being-removed-and-replaced-by.html
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